Details

Abstract / Summary

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a compelling perspective on the far-reaching hazards of military intervention. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that a withdrawal from Afghanistan should occur as soon as possible. The Soviet Union's senior leadership had become aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the forecasted results. Despite this state of affairs, operations in Afghanistan persisted and four more years passed before the Soviets finally withdrew their military forces.In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations, repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership, and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. Fenzel enumerates the series of misperceptions and misjudgments that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tracing the hazards of their military intervention and occupation. Ultimately, he offers a cautionary tale to nation states and policymakers considering military intervention and the use of force.

Field of Interest

Politics & Current Affairs

Author

Michael R. Fenzel, 1967-

Copyright Message

Copyright © 2017 Stanford University Press

Content Type

Book

Duration

0 sec

Warning: Contains explicit content

No

Format

Text

Page Count

193

Publication Year

2017

Publisher

Stanford University Press

Place Published / Released

Palo Alto, CA

Subject

Politics & Current Affairs, World History, Global Issues, Social Sciences, History, International Political Science, War and Violence, Wartime Conditions and Military Tactics, Afghanistan and its Borders, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and Civil War, Afghanistan Conflict (1980 -- ), Military aid, Military occupation, Decision making, Wars in Afghanistan, April 27, 1978–, Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, 1978-1992, Ciência Política Internacional, Ciencia Política Internacional, Guerra y Violencia, Guerra e Violência, Condições do Tempo de Guerra e Táticas Militares, Condiciones en Tiempos de Guerra y Tácticas Militares, Afganistán, Afeganistão, Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas; Unión Soviética, União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas; União Soviética, USSR (Historical Place), Soviet Union (Historical Place), Afghanistan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Historical Place), Conflicts and Resolution, International Response, 20th Century in World History (1914--2000)

Keywords and Translated Subjects

Ciência Política Internacional, Ciencia Política Internacional, Guerra y Violencia, Guerra e Violência, Condições do Tempo de Guerra e Táticas Militares, Condiciones en Tiempos de Guerra y Tácticas Militares, Afganistán, Afeganistão, Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas; Unión Soviética, União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas; União Soviética, USSR (Historical Place), Soviet Union (Historical Place)